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Abstract: The problems of the intellectual property ("IP") anticom-
mons are infamous. Many people fear that the potential for vast num-
bers of IP rights to cover a single good or service will prevent an enter-
prise from even attempting to launch a business Ivor fear of being
unduly taxed or retarded or simply held up. This Article offers a solu-
tion based on private ordering within the context of existing laws. This
approach uses a limited liability entity structured so that IP owners are
given an actual stake in the operating business and thus an incentive to
participate in the enterprise; and yet at the same time, the IP owners
face a number of constraints that mitigate their interest in acting oppor-
tunistically by holding out. Through carelitl attention to IP owner pay-
offs and self-restraint, the proposed structure is designed to coordinate
behavior among relevant II' owners, thus overcoming the anticommons
problem. This approach is designed to help lawyers serve their role as
transaction cost engineers who can structure relationships in ways that
get deals done.
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INTRODUCTION
A recent explosion in the IP literature focuses on a set of prob-
lems relating to an arrangement of property rights called an "anti-
commons."' The basic distinguishing feature of the IP anticommons
is the existence of such a large number of IP rights covering a single
good or service that the provision of that good or service is feared to
be unduly taxed and retarded, if not outright prevented. 2
An often-discussed example of the anticommons problem is
DNA-on-a-chip technology involving micro-arrays of thousands, or even
tens of thousands, of individual pieces of DNA. Each piece of DNA
may be covered by a different patent; and many of the patents may
have different owners. 3 It is feared that entering a business based on
such a chip would require the business owner to identify, find, and
then successfully transact with a staggering number of individual IP
owners. Such transaction costs, combined with the risk that any one of
I See, e.g., Michael A. Fidler & Rebecca S. Eisenberg, Can Patents. Deter Innovation? The
Anticommons in Biomedical Research, 280 SCIENCE 698 passim (1998) (introducing the term
"anticommons" to IP); Michael A. Heller, The 'Tragedy of the Anticommans: Property in the
Transition from Marx to Markets, 111 BABY. L REV. 621, 623-24 (1998) (defining anticom-
mons property generally). A separate body of work has explored the ways in which IP can
be seen as a "semi-commons." See grneral ly Robert A. Ileverl); The Information Semi-Commons,
18 BERKELEY TECH. 1,1. 1127 (20(13); Henry E. Smith, Governing the Die-Semicommons, 22
YALE J. ON REG. 289 (2005); Henry E. Smith, Semicommon Property Rights and Scattering in the
Open Fields, 29 J. LEGAL STun. 131 (2000); Greg R. Vetter, Open Source. Licensing and Scatter-
ing Opportunism in Softwam Standards, 48 B.C. L. REv. 225 (2007); Henry E. Smith, Intellec-
tual Property: An Information Cost Approach (Feb. 7, 2004) (unpublished manuscript, on
file with authors).
2 See Michael A. Heller, The Dynamic a natytics of Properly Law, 2 TitEoRrricat_ INQUIRIES
L. 79, 87-89 (2001) (providing a detailed description ()I' the term as it applies to 113).
3 See Heller & Eisenberg, supra note 1, at 699; Robert P. Merges & Richard R. Nelson,
On the Complex Economics of Patent Scope, 90 Coium. L Rtv. 839, 863-66, 875 (1990) (dis-
cussing the general possibility of patents blocking downstream work); Suzanne Scotchmer,
Standing on the Shoulders of Giants: Cumulative &worth and the Palma Law, 5 J. ECON. PERSP.
29, 30-32 (1991) (same). For examples of recent governmental reports expressing the
same concerns, see COMM'N ON INTELLECTUAL PROP. RIGHTS, INNOVATION & Putt. HEALTH,
WORLD HE:AUTII ORG., PUBLIC HEALTH INNOVATION AND INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY RIGHTS
(2006), available at http://wwwwho.int/intellectualproperty/documents/thereport/EN
PublicHealthReport.pdf; COMM. ON INTELLECTUAL. PROP. RIGHTS IN CENOMIC & PROTEIN
RESEARCH & INNOVATION, NAT'L RESEARCH COUNCIL, REAPING THE BENEFITS OF GENOMIC
AND P120TEOM IC RESEARCH: INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY' RIGHTS, INNOVATION, AND PUBLIC
HEAurit (2005), available al hap;//l'crmat.nap.edu/opettbook.pltp?record_id=11487& page
=R1; FTC, To PRomom INNOVATION: THE PROPER BALANCE OF CompErrrioN AND PATENT
LAW AND POLICY (2003), available at http://mmlic.gov/os/2003/10/innovationrpt.pdf;
WORLD HEAL'ITI ORG., GENETICS, GENomics AND THE PATENTING OF DNA: REVIEW OF
POTENTIAL IMPLICATIONS FOR HEALTH IN DEVELOPING COUNTRIES (2005), available at
lutp://www.who.int/genomics/FullReport.pdf,
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the IP owners could hold out and compromise the entire operation,
raise a number of problems for business and for the public at large.
Because access to such a plethora of IP rights is required, those want-
ing to enter a line of business using DNA-on-a-chip technology fear
that they cannot, and those seeking access to the products that such
businesses would have produced arc left wanting. 4 The impact may be
life threatening—preventing promising diagnoses and treatments tar-
geted to patients having a number of specific genetic profiles.`'
To be sure, the theoretical literature has debated whether there is
in fact an anticommons problem for property rights in general and
for IP in particular. 6 In his influential work on anticommons, Michael
Heller has focused on the fragmentation of interests in an asset.' In
response, Richard Epstein and Bruce Kuhlik 5 and one of the present
authors9 have pointed out that when the permission of bureaucrats is
required, as was the case for the unused stores in the post-socialist
economy that were the topic of Heller's initial work, efforts by such
bureaucrats to openly trade their permission for personal gain are
likely to trigger various forms of legal liability for graft, bribery, public
corruption, and the like; and the "market" for buying required ap-
provals from bureaucrats is likely to be relatively thin. IP rights are
different, they continue, because an [P owner in the United States
does not have the same incentive to avoid open transactions because
such deals are lawful and important to monetizing the value of the IP.
Other work by one of the present authors extends the analysis to show
how the anticommons problem is inapposite to IP rights that are
The holdout problem discussed here is akin to the problem raised by requiring una-
nimity in any decision by a group or stakeholders. For example, the problems of requiring
unanimity among lenders in efforts to restructure debt are well explored in a separate
literature. See generally Robert B. Ahdieh, Between Mandate and Market: Contract Transition in
the Shadow of the International Order, 53 EMORY L.J. 691 (2004); William W. Bration & C.
Aiitu Gulati, Sovereign Debt Reform and the Best Interest of Creditors, 57 VAND. L. Rim 1 (2004).
5 See, e.g., Robert F. Service, Microchip Arrays Put DNA on the Spot, 282 SclExcE 396, 397
(1998).
6 See infra notes 8-11 and accompanying text.
See generally Heller & Eisenberg, supra note 1; Heller, supra note 1.
See Richard Epstein & Bruce N. Kuhlik, Navigating the Anticommons for Pharmaceutical
Patents: Steady the Course on Hatch-Waxman 4-5 (Univ. of Chi. Law Sch. John M. Olin Pro-
gram in Law & Econ., Working Paper No. 209 (2d Series), 2004), available at hup://www.
law.tichicago.edu/Lawecon/WkngPprs_201-25/209.rae-bk.anticommons.pa
9 See F. Scott Kieft., Coordination, Property & Intellectual Pimperty: An Unconventional Ap-
proach to Anticompetitive Effects & Downstream Access 42-46 (Wash. Univ. Sch. of Law Pub.
Law & legal Theory Research Paper Series, Working Paper No. 06-06-01, Stanford Law
Sch. John M. Olin Program in Law & Econ., Working Paper No, 323, 2006), available at
http://ssrn.com/abstract=910656.
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clear, certain, owned by a residual claimant, and openly tradable; and
that the anticommons problem studied by Heller thereby can he seen
as no different from the problem of permit thickets studied earlier by
Epstein. 10
 Put simply, it is the nature of an IP owner's right to exclude
or say "no" (or, more precisely, the nature of the associated right to
say "yes" to a deal) that is the key to the supposed problem of too
many diffuse rights of exclusion—whether termed a "permit thicket"
or an "anticommons"—rather than the number of individuals from
whom permission must be sought. Nevertheless, because IP rights in
the real world never will be perfectly clear, certain, and openly trad-
able, and because there will never be an absolutely definitive set of all
residual claimants, the anticommons problem is one worth further
exploration."
Suggested responses to the anticommons problem include a host
of law and policy reforms that target certain types of patents. 12 Repre-
sentative examples include a shift towards relaxed enforcement of IP
rights that in effect would leave enforcement of certain patents only
backed up by a liability rule rather than a property rule.'s Other ex-
amples include the outright elimination or prevention of such patents
through the use of various enhanced patentability and patent-validity
requirements, such as utility; statutory subject matter, description, and
obviousness. 14
This Article offers an alternative response to the anticommons
problem, to the extent that it exists, based on private ordering by
market actors within the context of existing laws and judicial doc-
trines. 15
 The core of this approach is an appropriately structured op-
la See id. (citing Richard A. Epstein, The Permit Power Meets the Constitution, 81 lown L.
REV. 407 (1995)).
ll Of course, kw even the best,defined property rights, transaction COStS are real costs.
But for a discussion of the many ways in which, as a practical matter, many of the transac-
tiott costs underlying the anticommons prohlem either are mitigated, rationally borne by
property (mias who can extract value by decreasing their impact on users, or empirically
shown to be almost nonexistent due to broad classes of infringements that are simply al-
lowed to persist, see id. at 31-36.
12 See infra notes 13-14 and accompanying text.
13 See, r.g., Oren Bar-Gilt & Gideon Parchmovsky, 11 Marketplace for Ideas, 84 TEx. I,. REV.
395, 412-17 (2005) (discussing liability rule treatment for IP rights); liatherine J. Strand-
burg, What Does the Public Get? Experimental Use and the Patent Bargain, 2004 Wis. L. Ruv. 81,
142-46 (arguing that certain activities 51100k1 be given what in effect would be free com-
pulsory license).
14
 See generally Helen M. Berman & Rochelle C. Dreyfuss, Reflections on the Seienee and
Law of Milldam!
	 Genumics, and Drug Development, 53 UCLA L. Rt:v. 871 (2006).
15
 That is, we take as a given the existing-
 laws and the government that enforces them.
Our use or hue term "private ordering" dues not contemplate the total absence of govern-
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crating entity—in the case of a DNA-on-a-chip business, this will be
the entity that makes the chips. This entity will serve as a coordination
vehicle among the team of relevant stakeholders, which includes IP
owners; the promoter of the business, which is likely to be an IP
owner itself; and ultimately customers and other interest groups. The
basic bargain offered to the myriad [P owners, who are the source of
the anticommons problem, is that each owner will receive some
financial .return, some control over the operating business, and essen-
tial collateral information and related business opportunities. In ex-
change for receiving these benefits, the IP owners will give the operat-
ing entity a limited, nonexclusive license to the owner's IP. This
feature of the structure speaks directly to the problem of excessively
diffuse property rights.
Getting the IP owners to accept the deal offered by the promoter
requires that the entity be structured so that IP owners are given a
meaningful stake in the business, which will encourage them to opt
in. At the same time, the deal must be structured to ensure that each
[P owner will have little reason to play holdup games by opting out.
Further, the structure contemplates that the business's customers and
relevant influential interest groups may "shame" IP owners to partici-
pate in the enterprise by waging public relations campaigns on the
Internet or through more traditional media outlets.
The core concepts supporting the proposed structure are the
dual pillars of coordination and self-restraint. In effect, the transac-
tion is designed to incentivize [P owners to cooperate in the enter-
prise by credibly committing the parties to a structure that limits the
potential upside for an IP owner if it chooses to hold out for a larger
stake. The deal structure also leverages social and peer pressure to
further encourage opting in. If it is costly to hold out and if doing so
promises little upside, it is rational for 1P owners to exercise self-
restraint and not to act opportunistically, but instead to coordinate
their activities through the operating entity. Each IP owner gains from
cooperating, not defecting. The coordination and self-restraint con-
templated here allow for a private ordering solution to the anticom-
mons problem that avoids some of the costs and risks of legal reform,
while suggesting a number of basic policy implications for IP.
ment enforcement of law. Rather, we use "private ordering" to refer to circumstances
where parties, given extant legal and regulatory regimes, order the substance of their zit.-
fairs and transactions as they see lit and resort to the judicial system for enforcement.
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Such coordination and self-restraint are two issues often over-
looked in the property literature in general, but emphasized through-
out the work of both of the present authors. 16
 That is, the approach
offered here Follows the commercialization/coordination theory of
IP 17 that often is seen as being "pro-IP" and "pro-IP owners." Here,
the approach is used to show how those wanting access to IP can take
seriously the transaction costs facing both IP users and IP owners in
developing an entity that mitigates these costs in a way that benefits
both groups.
This Article's proposal fbliows the "Gilsonian" tradition of show-
ing how lawyers can be helpful "transaction cost engineers" who struc-
ture beneficial deals to overcome obstacles. 18 Lawyers are not simply
pernicious transaction costs themselves who stand in the way of deals
that otherwise would get done. t9 Indeed, many deals would not take
place without the efforts of lawyers who find creative ways to bring
parties together.
This Article proceeds as follows: Part I sketches the private order-
ing solution, paying particular attention to sonic of the basic hurdles
it must overcome to have a chance of succeeding. Part II further dis-
cusses some complicating obstacles and limitations of the proposal,
16 See infra note 17.
17 See Kieft', .supra note 9, at 57-70 (exploring the coordination aspects of commerciali-
zation theory). See generally F. Scott Kieft', Properly Rights and Property Rules for Commercializing
Inventions, 85 MINN. L. REV. 697 (2001) (exploring a commercialization theory of IP).
18 See Ronald J. Gilson, lidue Creation 17 Business Lawyers: Legal Skills and Asset Pricing, 94
YALE L.J. 239, 255 (1984) (describing lawyers as "transaction cost engineers"); see also Lisa
Bernstein, The Silicon tulle' Lawyer as Transaction Cost Engineer?, 74 OR. L, Pow. '239, 241
(1995) (further exploring Gilson's analytical kamework of the lawyer as transaction cost
engineer and, in addition to Gilson, citing Lawrence M. Friedman et al., Law, Lawyers, and
Legal Pradice in Silicon Willey: A Preliminary Repod, 64 1ND, Li. 555, 562 (1989) (noting that
"[Otte Silicon Valley lawyer not only works with engineers, he thinks of himself as a kind of
engineer—a legal engineer ... his job is to solve problems, to take a principle, a task and
engineer it legally")); Bernard Black & Reinier Kraakman, A SelfEnforring Model of Corporate
Law, 109 1 -{ARV. 1.„ REV. 1911, 1923 (1996) (pointing out that in addition to lawyers, "savvy
investors and issuers" also help facilitate transactions); Curtis J. Milhaupt & Mark D. West,
The Dark Side of Private Ordering: An Institutional and Empirical Analysis of Organized Crime, 67
U. Cm. L. REv. 41, 58 (200(1) (also using term "transaction cost engineers" for lawyers);
Troy A. Paredes, A Systems Approach to Corporate Governance Worm: Why Importing U.S, C01110-
rate Law Isn't the Answer, 45 Wm. & MARY L. REAr. 1055, 1110-12 (2003) (exploring Gilson's
analytical framewtirk of the lawyer as transaction cost engineer).
19 See Ronald J. Gilson, Seeking Competitive Bids Parses Pure Passivity in Tender Offer Defense,
35 STAN. L. Ray. 51, 62-63 (1982) ("Let inc start with two important elements of transac-
tion costs in the acquisition setting; inlOrmation costs necessary to identity the opportu-
nity; and mechanical costs—for example, lawyers', accountants', and investment bankers'
fees—necessary to effect the transaction 1111(1 cope with regulatory or other barriers (in-
cluding defensive tactics by the target).").
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including some challenges that, although we think unlikely to occur,
may be especially difficult to overcome if they do. Part III points out
how such a private ordering solution avoids some of the risks associ-
ated with legal reform. Part IV explores some implications for IP the-
ory and policy that are elucidated by the proposed deal structure.
I. SKETCHING THE BASIC STRUCTURE AND BASIC HURDLES
The Article begins by briefly summarizing the basic structure of
the transaction, which is depicted in Figure 1. The discussion then
proceeds by unpacking the key features of the deal, including many of
the basic and more complex hurdles it must overcome, in the rest of
Part I and in Part II.
A. Basic Structure
In the deal, a promoter—the impetus behind the transaction—
establishes an operating entity. Most likely, the operating entity will be
a limited liability company ("LLC"), although it might also he a lim-
ited partnership or a corporation. The operating entity will engage in
a business, such as commercializing DNA-on-a-chip technology, that,
requires access to a plethora of IP rights. It is anticipated that the
relevant universe of IP owners will grant the operating entity a lim-
ited, nonexclusive license of the relevant IP. 2° Assuming the operating
entity is an LLC, then each licensor-IP owner will receive a member-
ship interest in the LLC. 21 Each licensor-IP owner's equity interest in
2° It is recognized that the key to avoiding the anticommons problem is getting this li-
cense granting to occur with a high degree of predictability and certainty. To help the
reader understand the basic structure of the deal we are proposing, we provide an over-
view here and then discuss the more complex reasoning throughout the remainder of Part
I and in Part II.
21 If the operating entity is a limited partnership, the licensor-IP owners will receive a
limited partnership interest; and if the operating entity is a corporation, the licensor-IP
owners will receive shares of stock.
The transaction contemplates that the membership interests, limited partnership in-
terests, and shares of stock will be placed in private olliirings and thus not subject to the
registration requirements of the federal Securities Act of 1933. 15 U.S.C. §§ 77a-77aa
(2000). That said, if there are 500 or more licensor-1P owners, the operating entity may
have to comply with swim's requirements under the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 (the
"Exchange Act"). 15 U.S.C. § 78a-78rimt (2000). To avoid Exchange Act requirements, it
might be necessary to have more than one operating entity, each of %Odell would have
fewer than 500 licensor-IP owners as members, limited partners, or shareliolclers. Alterna-
tively, it might be possible to structure the transaction to include several pass-through "li-
censing entities." Each licensing entity would be a licensee of the licensor-IP owners. The
licensing entities in turn would relicense the IP rights to the operating entity and would be
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the operating entity will entitle it to some financial return, as well as
some control over the entity through voting rights. As a result of par-
ticipating in the enterprise, we expect that each licensor-IP owner also
will receive valuable information and will benefit from complemen-
tary sales and other business opportunities that arise from being in-
volved in the enterprise. The promoter will receive similar financial
and other benefits, and, as a practical matter, likely will have the most
control over most aspects of the entity.
We anticipate that the financial, informational, and other gains
from engaging in the enterprise will induce many, if not most or even
all, IP owners to opt in to the deal. But the structure allows that peer
pressure among 1P owners, as well as social pressure from the operat-
ing entity's customers and other interest groups, also will encourage
IP owners to participate. The structure, though, accommodates the
possibility that some IP owners will opt out. 22
the members, limited partners, or shareholders of the operating entity. This two-tiered
structure contemplates that there would be fewer than 500 licensing entities to avoid Ex-
change Act obligations for the operating entity. This all having been said, the membership
interests (in the case of an LLC) and the limited partnership interests (in the case of a
limited partnership) might not constitute securities tinder the federal securities laws if the
licensor-IP owners exert sufficient control over the operating entity. Neither the Securities
Act of 1933 nor the Exchange Act would apply to such nonsecurities. If the operating en-
tity were a corporation, the shares of stock it issues would be securities regardless of how
much control the licensor-IP owners exerted. See generally Louis Loss 8z JoEi. SELIGNIAN,
FUNDANIENTALS OF SECURITIES REGULATION 82-87, 354-70, 435-44 (4th ed. 2000).
22
 An IP owner that does not opt in might not be holding out strategically for more
value, but might simply have a reasonable and good faith preference not to participate in
the enterprise at all. In some cases, there might be no way to have structii•ed the deal to
entice such an IP owner to participate. Some IP owners, for example, might want to "go it
alone" or might have other business opportunities on which they prefer to locus, notvbith-
standing that the operating entity only requires a limited, nonexclusive license of the IR
Some IP owners, however, might have been persuaded to opt in if the deal were structured
differently. Accordingly, to maximize the number of 1P owners who find the opportunity
attractive, the promoter might wish to consult various IP owners early to get a sense of how
best to structure the enterprise, including acceptable royalties, governance, and business
operations.
Resources
IP Owners
Operating EntityMoney
- Money
Voting Power
Social Pressure 	 elInformation
4
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Figure 1: Basic Organizational Chart
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B. Bask Hurdles: Unpacking the Structure
For the proposed approach to work, it must overcome at least a
core set of basic hurdles that businesspeople and their advisors rou-
tinely address in structuring deals. First, the entity must be attractive
to rational actors focusing on their financial payoffs. That is, the deal
must be financially profitable. Second, parties sometimes behave irra-
tionally and typically behave strategically. Recognizing that people
respond to more than financial payoffs, the transaction contemplates
that reputational sanctions may induce IP owners to opt in when oth-
erwise they might behave opportunistically by holding out for a larger
financial stake, even if it jeopardizes the deal. Third, the collective
action that the operating entity is designed to facilitate must with-
stand antitrust scrutiny. Fourth, the entity must generally be seen as
socially constructive to mitigate the risk that courts, administrative
agencies, or legislatures will not tolerate it.
In the discussions that follow, each obstacle will be addressed in
turn and related back to the feature of the deal that responds to it.
Each deal component is shown to he loosely analogous to an existing
business arrangement. These analogies are offered as helpful exam-
ples to illustrate some key aspects of the suggested approach. For this
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reason, they are necessarily abbreviated and stylized summaries in-
tended only to highlight particular characteristics of what in the real
world are of course highly complex and nuanced arrangements. That
is, the accounts of these loosely analogous arrangements are not of-
fered as complete accounts in their own right, but merely as points of
comparison to highlight especially salient aspects of the proposed
transaction.
Before going further a Final caveat about the precise scope of the
present project must be noted. The goal of this Article is to suggest a
new approach, not to prove or warrant that it will work. As with any
new business model, the first step is to explain what it is, how it gen-
erally will operate, why it should be considered, anti what some major
obstacles may be. As with any new business model, the precise con-
tours and details of any version of the structure that is implemented
necessarily will be left to the deals that actually get struck in practice.
These are beyond the scope of the present project, which is limited to
providing an initial sketch of the structure that lawyers, investment
bankers, and businesspeople could use as a starting point in doing a
real deal. Also, as with any new business model, only actual decisions
by agencies, courts, and legislators will show how well the transaction
will be received by the legal and political processes. Legal and regula-
tory risks are always present.
1. Hurdle One: Limited Liability and Financial Payoffs
The first hurdle For the proposed entity to overcome is that it
must be structured so that it has at least prima facie appeal to rational
actors. The key question explored here, therefore, is how to get a
huge and diffuse set of rational IP owners focusing on their financial
payoffs to elect to give the operating entity sufficient permission to
operate so that investment in the entity's operation by the promoter
and other members of the team, such as employees and creditors, is
worthwhile. The answer, discussed more fully below, is tied to limited
liability in two fundamental respects. First, limited liability mitigates
the risk that the promoter and the IP owners will be personally liable
for any debts or obligations of the operating entity. Second, limited
liability helps ensure that the operating entity does not have a "hos-
tage" (for example, substantial retained earnings) that an IP owner
choosing to hold out can go after.
The anticommons problem stems from the need to obtain a non-
exclusive license from each of the pertinent IP owners to engage at
least in the limited use needed to conduct the desired line of busi-
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ness. For example, the need to obtain such licenses is implicated in
the production of a diagnostic chip containing thousands of patented
DNA sequences. The literature stresses the transaction costs and the
seeming waste in identifying, finding, and then successfully transact-
ing with such a staggering number of individual IP owners, especially
in the face of the risk that any one could hold out and compromise
the entire effort after search and negotiation costs associated with
many of the others have been incurred. 23 The wasteful costs associ-
ated with transacting over these IP rights arc particularly troubling
where, as is likely the case for a diagnostic DNA chip, no additional
know-how or even materials are needed from the IP owner because
they are readily available from the public domain. Therefore, the crux
of the problem lies in the nature of the IP right itself, which is the
right to exclude others from using the subject matter covered by that
IP right. Put differently, the problem is seen as being only about free-
dom to operate, rather than about the need to obtain other goods or
services.
Because the IP owner's right to exclude is backed up ultimately
by its right to sue an infringer to obtain damages, to obtain damages
enhanced by attorney fees and potential trebling, as well as to obtain
an outright injunction, the ultimate driver of the anticommons effect
appears to be the credible threat of countless lawsuits. But familiar
notions of limited liability have long operated, indeed by design, pre-
cisely to make business investments more attractive notwithstanding
the threat of lawsuits. A business structure that could operate in the
face of such a threat offers at least a starting point for a potential solu-
tion to the anticommons problem in certain cases.
Thus, the first step in the proposed structure involves setting up
the new business within a distinct limited liability entity, such as a
separate limited liability company, limited partnership, or corpora-
tion. 24 Because of the flexibility it affords the parties, an LLC would
23
 See generally Heller & Eisenberg, supra note 1; Heller, supra note 1.
24 For more on limited liability, see, e.g., Frank H. Easterbrook & Daniel R. Fischel,
Limited Liability and the Corporation, 52 U. Cut. L. REV. 89, 105-06 (1985); Timothy P.
Glynn, Beyond "Unlimiting" Shareholder Liability: Vicarious Tort Liability for Corporate Officers, 57
VAN!). L. REV. 329, 336-43 (2004); Henry G. Marine, Our Two Corporation Systems: Law and
Economics, 53 VA. L. REV. 259, 261-65 (1967); Robert B. Thompson, Unpacking Limited Li-
ability: Direct and Vicarious Liability of Corporate Participants for 'farts of the Enterprise, 47 VAN!).
L. REV. 1, 6-40 (1994). See generally Joseph A. Grundiest, The Limited Puffin? of Unlimited
Liability: A Capital Markets Perspective, 102 YALE 1.4 387 (1992); Paul Halpern et al., An Eco-
nomic Analysis of Limited Liability in Corporation Law, 30 U. TORONTO L,I. 117 (1980); Henry
Hansmann & Reinier Kraakman, Toward Unlimited Shareholder Liability for Corporate Torts,
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probably be the preferred entity form. Limited liability for a firm's
equity holders and other stakeholders will provide an incentive to in-
vest in the entity despite the threat of countless lawsuits by IP owners.
Although it may seem unattractive to invest in an entity that may face
countless lawsuits, many firms operate in the face of possibly countless
claims. For example, Dow Corning has continued to operate in the
Pace of myriad litigations involving its breast implant business; 25 nu-
merous companies, such as HaIliburton, continue to operate in the
face of seemingly endless asbestos litigation; 26
 Merck continues to re-
search and develop pharmaceuticals notwithstanding being tied up in
countless lawsuits over Vioxx; 27
 and the tobacco companies have not
gone out of business. In each of these instances, despite the spectre of
costly litigation, the businesses presently are operating in a way that
generates gains for each of the firm's constituencies: shareholders,
managers, laborers, business creditors, and customers. Put differently,
the combination of the limited liability of the corporate form with the
nonfraudulent transfers of dividends, salary, debt service, and cus-
tomer support makes their business activity worth pursuing, even in
the face of so many lawsuits. The basic purpose of these analogies is to
instantiate how a business can operate in a way that benefits stake-
100 VALE L.J. 1879 (1991); David W Leebron, Limited Liability. Ton Victims, and Creditors, 91
COLUM. L. REV. 1505 (1991).
For a discussion of the related topic of judgment proofing, see generally Lynn M.
LoPticki, The Death of Liability, 11)6 YALe LJ. 1 (1990); Lynn M. LoPticki, The Essential Stnec-
lure of; ludgment Proofing, 51 STAN. L. Rev. 147 (1998); Lynn M. LoPucki, The hrelietable Logic
of judgment Proofing: A Reply to Profirssor Schroam, 52 STAN. L. REV. 55 (1999); Lynn M.
LoPticki. Virtual Judgment Proofing: A Rejoinder, 107 YALE L. 1413 (1998); Charles W.
Mooney, Jr., Judgment Proofing, Bankniphy Policy, and the Dark Side of 'Rill Liability, 52 STAN.
L. REV. 73 (1999); Steven L. Schwarcz, The Inherent Irrationality of Judgment Proofing, 52
STAN. L. REV. 1 (1999); Steven L. Schwartz, Judgment Proofing: A Rejoinder; 52 STAN. L. REV.
77 (1999); Steven Shavell, The Judgment Proof Problem, 6 INT't. REV. L. & EcoN. 45 (1986);
Jarnesi. White, Corporate Judgment Proofing: A Response to Lynn LoPudn's The Death of Liabil-
ity, 107 VALE L.J. 1363 (1998). For a discussion of' these issues by the present authors in a
different context, see F. Scott Kieff & Troy A. Paredes, .4n Approach to Intellectual Property,
Bankruptcy, and Corporate Control, 82 WAsii. U. L.Q. 1313, 1331-38 (2004).
25
 See Press Release, Dow Corning Corp., Dow Corning Emerges from Chapter 11 on
June 1, 2004 (June I, 2004), available at http://wwwdowcorning.com/contentinews/pr_
chapterl lemergence.asp?DCWS=&DCWSS= (describing Dow Corning's financial recovery
from the breast implant litigation).
26
 tire 14ailiburton, Asbestos Printer, hup://www,lialliburton.c(nn/ir/asbestos_printerjsp
(last visited Nov. 9, 2006).
27 See Press Release, Merck & Co., Merck Updates Status of VIOXX Litigation and SEC
Inquiry (Jan. 28, 2005), available at http://www.tnerck.com/newsroom/press_releases/
corporate/2005_0128.11mA.
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holders even when facing the risk of a set of impending claims that
could put the enterprise out of business.
But perhaps more important for present purposes is the flip side
of this limited liability coin—specifically, the proposed structure lev-
erages the veil of limited liability to help ensure that the IP owners
eventually are constrained and choose cooperation over defection
when facing such a business by making it considerably more likely
that the operating entity will not have an interest in a potential hos-
tage that is worth it to an IP owner to threaten. Put differently, a basic
challenge of the deal is to dissuade IP owners from holding out for a
larger piece of the pie. This is always a concern when panics bargain.
We take up this issue more in Part II, but we stress one point here: the
operating entity could be financed and run in a way so that it has few
assets, which helps ensure that the benefits for an IP holder of opting
in exceed the potential gains from holding out.
The structure contemplates that any profits the operating entity
enjoys will regularly be distributed to the promoter and licensor-IP
owners, leaving few profits in the entity. Consequently, an IP owner
that holds out will only find a small pool of assets that it can tap into
in a successful infringement action. And the corporate veil of limited
liability will go a long way toward ensuring, although without abso-
lutely guaranteeing, that the suing IP owner cannot pierce through
the entity to go after the assets of the promoter or the participating IP
owners. 28 Indeed, businesses regularly "judgment proof" themselves
in this fashion, and courts routinely respect such corporate structur-
ing.
More to the point, the entity could be run to make sure that the
existing claims on its future gross receipts come as close as possible to
approximating their value. For example, those participating in the
entity, including the promoter itself, may have claims in the form of
ordinary employment compensation or other contract pay, such as
consulting fees or factory-line rental fees, aside from their equity
stake. Simply recharacterizing profits as some form of contract pay-
ment (wage, rent, etc.) as a way of "zeroing out" the operating entity
2E1 For more on veil piercing, see generally Stephen M. Bainbridge, Abolishing La: Veil
Piercing, 20(15 U. ILL. L. REV. 77; Stephen M. Bainbridge, Abolishing Veil Piercing, 26 J. CORP.
L. 479 (2001); Robert B. Thompson, Herring the Corpointe Veil: An Empirical Study, 76 Cott-
N Eta. L. REV. 1036 (1991).
In addition, in the face of adverse judgments against it for infringement, the operating
end ty's willingness and ability to file bankruptcy may leave little if any value for holdout-I1'
owners that successfully sue.
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may still leave an available hostage for a holdout. But concessions
would be required from the recipients of these wage, rental, and simi-
lar payments to release these funds for payment to a holdout. In addi-
tion, once made, such payments to the promoter or certain licensor-
IP owners should be further out of reach of a creditor (such as a
holdout having a judgment fir infringement in its favor) than distri-
butions of the operating entity's profits. Moreover, claimants to the
operating entity's profits may be third parties. In that case, any re-
quired concessions would be particularly difficult to obtain to release
funds to pay a holdout to opt in; and any sort of piercing the corpo-
rate veil doctrine or broad theory of substantive consolidation should
not bring payments to such third parties within the reach of an IP
holdout. Further, the operating entity may be emboldened in refusing
any holdout's demands because reneging on the operating entity's
wage and contract terms with third parties could have serious reputa-
tional consequences for the en terprise. 29
Because the operating entity is likely to be new rather than estab-
lished, initial financing presumably will be needed, such as for various
capital assets including real estate and equipment. Appropriately struc-
tured financing with debt, as opposed to equity, can further decrease
the potential hostage threat to the owners of the operating entity while
at the same time decreasing the direct benefit available to an IP owner
wanting to sue kw infringement. Not only does the use of debt ensure
there is a preexisting claim against the entity's cash flow, but the use of
a security interest in the operating entity's underlying assets—be they
plant, equipment, real estate, inventory, or receivables—would both
protect the creditor and decrease the resources available to satisfy a
judgment in favor of a holdout. Additionally, the operating entity can
ensure that it does not own any substantial assets by simply renting what
it needs for the business. For example, to the extent established facto-
ries owned by others often are not in continuous use, such excess ca-
pacity may be rented. Indeed, such foundry services are a big business
in the modern electronics industry." The business renting these re-
29
 To be sure, the operating-
 entity's interest in using revenues to make such payments
can trigger its own hostage effect in at least two ways. First, the revenues themselves may be
attractive to a holdout as a source oI divect financial benefit that can be taken. Second, the
revenues can be blocked from reaching the parties to which the operating entity owes
money in a way that will cause a negative reputational effect for the operating entity if the
holdout successfully obtains an injunction.
20 See Norm Alster, Investing: Considering Chip Shores? Look for Plant Owners, N.Y. TIMES,
Feb. 1, 2004, § 3, at 311.
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sources to the operating entity may or may not be related to the operat-
ing entity—that is, the lessor may be the promoter, an IP owner, or
some third party. 31
To deprive a holdout of a possible hostage to target, the operat-
ing entity also can keep its overall revenue stream low by, for example,
offering the DNA chip at a low price. Although such a pricing strategy
decreases the hostage effect, it does not compromise what likely are
key benefits for participating IP owners and the promoter—namely,
the informational benefits and derivative business opportunities dis-
cussed below. To the contrary, setting a low price should encourage
wider use of the DNA chip and might be a good public relations strat-
egy for the enterprise and its constituencies. This could feed back into
more social and peer pressure being brought to bear on holdouts,
encouraging them to opt in. Any hostage risk posed by the informa-
tional and derivative business benefits would be mitigated by the fact
that the holdout would be denying itself access to such benefits if it
were to shut down the operating entity.
Although a strategy of keeping financial profits low seems coun-
terintuitive, such a strategy may be key to reducing the holdout risk by
denying a potential holdout a hostage that it can take for bargaining
leverage. Even if some participants in the operating entity preferred a
more traditional profit maximization strategy, the marginal benefit of
generating a larger profit and more free cash flow may not be
sufficiently attractive when compared to the added risk this creates by
offering a more attractive hostage to a holdout. Thus, the choice of
31 We are designating as the "promoter" the person—human being or legal person like
a business—who basically organizes the operating entity in the first instance. This person
may be an IP owner or someone interested in complementary business activities. It is bung-
inable that instead of being a for-profit, private sector business the promoter is a govern-
ment agency, a nongovernmental organization, or a university. Our intuition, though, is
that others are more likely to participate in the enterprise if the promoter is a for-profit,
private sector person than if it is a government entity or a non-profit organization, because
the promoter's for-profit, private sector status is likely to give it a more open and predict-
able agenda as a business partner. We also think that, for society as a whole, it will be better
for the promoter to be a for-profit, private sector person because we think that the mar-
ket's price system is generally better at deciding which deals should be clone, although we
of course recognize that this is open to debate. Put differently, we would prefer that the
actual stakeholders—promoter, IP owners, employees, creditors, and customers—make the
decisions, not political players or bureaucrats.
It should also be noted that in structuring the deal, the promoter's interests have to he
taken into account. Initiating and operating the DNA-on-a-chip business will require non-
trivial amounts of money, skill, time, etc. In exchange, the promoter will want cash, kudos,
control, etc. How much of each of these the promoter gets will be a function of how the
transaction transpires in practice.
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low profits and few IP owner holdouts is preferable to high profits and
a substantial risk of holdouts and infringement lawsuits. 32
The combined effect of these steps should lead to a business en-
tity that has a narrow and shallow pool of assets and, if desired, a net
income stream that is not much more than a trickle. To keep poten-
tial litigants at bay, the entity is designed to be simultaneously unap-
pealing as a litigation target and appealing as a business partner.
In fact, the operating entity has its own ability to threaten hos-
tages in a way that can exert leverage over IP owners. The key to a
patent owner's value is the credible threat of an infringement suit,
and obtaining a final court judgment of infringement can be sig-
nificantly stalled, if not prevented, for almost any patent today if the
patent is placed into reexamination before the Patent Office. Thus,
the operating entity can threaten to place into reexamination any
patent owned by a holdout. 33
 Putting a holdout's patent into reex-
amination would cost the operating entity very little and, in effect,
would likely tie up the patent in the Patent Office for several years,
interfering with any enforcement or licensing efforts by the IP owner.
It is not enough just to create a disincentive to sue for infringe-
ment. For the operating entity to be appealing as a business partner
to the IP owners, the IP owners must enjoy a real upside from opting
in. The entity must announce a set of "rules" (deal terms) that offer
every potential claimant who might otherwise sue for infringement
the option to bring its own bona fide straw—albeit only a narrow
32
 The opt in / hold out decision lacing each IP owner is itself a garlic among the IP
owners, not just a game between the IP owners on the one hand and the promoter on the
other. While each holdout may stand to gain a considerable amount if it were the only
holdout, the potential value or holding out decreases as the number or holdouts increases.
This description recalls a classic prisoner's dilemma. q Doug Lichtman, Patent Holdouts in
the Standard-Setting Process 2-3,10-12 (Univ. of Chi. John M. Olin Program in Law & Econ.,
Working Paper No. 292,20N), (mailable at http://ssrn.com/abstract=902646
 (arguing that
with many potential holdouts in a standard-setting process, the incentive of each IP owner
to sue is diminished).
53
 For a discussion of the modern reexamination system, including the reasons it can
be viewed as placing a large cloud over all patents in it socially undesirable manner, see F.
Scott Kielf, The Case for Registering Patents and the Law and Economia of Present Patent-
Obtaining Rules, 45 B.C. L. REY. 55,115-18 (2003) (discussing the public choice problems
with modern reexamination proceedings). The theoretical concerns about reexamination
have been borne out in the recent proceedings over the patent asserted against the Black-
berry service. See Patents/Reexamination: NT? Charges Misconduct in PTO ' s Review of Patents in
Blackberry Dispute, 72 PAT. TRADEMARK & COMM:DT J. 52,52-53 (2006) (discussing the
many ways in which the infringer in that case brought improper political pressure and
gained improper access to secret Patent Office proceedings as tools for holding the pat-
entee's patent hostage during litigation and settlement proceedings).
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one—to come drink from the entity's asset pool. That is, every IP
owner with a potential bona fide claim for infringement must be of-
fered a chance to receive a modest royalty payment in exchange for
granting a license to the operating entity. This might be through a
separate licensing arrangement or, more likely, through the structure
of the entity itself. For example, if the proposed entity is an LLC, each
IP owner could be granted a membership interest in the entity, with a
right to participate in the entity's profits, in exchange for granting the
entity a license. Using a separate licensing arrangement suffers from
one particular disadvantage—namely, it leaves open the possibility
that the promoter will have to engage in one-off negotiations with
each IP owner. This matters because it creates numerous bilateral
bargaining situations in which an IP owner can threaten holding out
if it does not receive a larger piece of the pie (or, to mix metaphors, a
bigger straw). Alternatively, the promoter could offer the LLC agree-
ment for the operating entity to all IP owners on a take-it-or-leave-it
basis with each IP owner's stake in the business represented by its
membership interest in the LLC. This second approach credibly com-
mits the promoter to a predetermined deal with the IP owners that is
not open to renegotiation. Essentially, the promoter takes off the ta-
ble the prospect of giving IP owners different deals if they all must
sign up to the entity's LLC agreement, an agreement that the pro-
moter cannot realistically go back and restructure."
The precise terms governing IP owner royalties may take several
forms. For example, because early certainty will he important to all
constituencies, a higher amount may be offered to those who self-
identify early, providing an incentive to do so.
In addition to the direct financial return the IP owners enjoy in
exchange for granting limited, nonexclusive licenses to the operating
entity, the IP owners also will have the opportunity to exercise at least
some control by participating in the entity's governance. This will give
the IP owners a different type of ownership in the operating entity
than money: the right to participate in its decision making. Exactly
how much influence the IP owners will have as compared to the pro-
moter is an important deal term that will have to be negotiated within
the context of each transaction. Such management questions are not
unique or intractable, though. Governance has to be dealt with in
nearly all deals.
34 For more, see infra notes 69-73 and accompanying text.
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Aside from the profit interest licensor-IP owners will enjoy, par-
ticipation in the operating entity also should generate substantial in-
direct benefits for the IP owners, providing further incentive for IP
owners to opt in, even if, as suggested above, the entity's financial
profits are kept low. It is quite possible that these indirect benefits will
be much larger economically than the IP owner's direct financial
benefits from the operating entity's business. For example, in the case
of a DNA-on-a-chip business, each participating IP owner presumably
will learn a great deal of information that will meaningfully help it
derive financial benefit from other uses of its IP. The main purpose of
technologies like DNA-on-a-chip is that such technologies allow a
large, seemingly homogeneous population to be segmented into dis-
tinct subpopulations. By giving the chip venture a limited, nonexclu-
sive license to include its particular 1)NA segment on the chip, the
owner of a patent on that DNA segment will at a minimum learn
which subpopulations are interested in its 1)NA segment and may gain
insight into new uses for the DNA segment. 55 The licensor-IP owner
or its other business partners will then be able to derive financial re-
turns from a business model that uses the DNA segment to further
treat or diagnose that subpopulation or For other uses that come to
light as a result of having participated in the operating entity. 36 In
short, licensor-IP owners likely will benefit from additional business
opportunities that are derivative of their decision to opt in to the
structure we propose.
To summarize, the upside for [P owners and the promoter is that
the deal gets done, which generates some financial gains from the
operating entity's business for the IP owners and the promoter, but
which also generates useful information for IP owners that may be
exploited in other business ventures. The deal may also generate use-
ful information and business opportunities for the promoter, which
itself may contribute IP to the enterprise. The incentive to opt in is
coupled with a disincentive for IP owners to hold out. One key to dis-
suading IP owners from holding out is to structure the deal so that
there is no meaningful available hostage for a holdout to take. At a
35
 The license given by the IP owners to the operating entity only needs to be nonex-
clusive ;MCI limited to the entity's particular business model, because that is all the entity
needs to operate. At the saute time, this preserves the ability for the IP owners to extract
value from other business ventures, including other iterations of the type of entity pro-
posed here.
" These are similar to the benefits that the Google Library Project offers to IP owners.
See infia notes 55.-63 and accompanying text (discussing the Google Library Project).
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minimum, the assets and free cash flow the operating entity has avail-
able to satisfy any judgment against it in favor of an IP owner suing for
infringement must be sufficiently small so that the transaction costs
an IP owner incurs in attempting to appropriate such value makes
litigation uneconomical.
The limited pool of operating entity net assets, particularly if
combined with a limited trickle of net income, impacts an IP owner's
payoffs. The IP owners that arrive with a straw in hand to drink from
the pool of the operating entity's assets and income stream will face a
relatively straightforward payoff choice. They can either use the straw
to take a sip or they can sue and net little to nothing. That said, the
operating entity need not be a financial failure to achieve this result,
and in fact may do quite well. It is simply that the resources an IP
owner can expect to appropriate by holding out need only be ex-
ceeded by the financial and other costs of litigation for IP owners to
rationally elect to opt out of litigation and in to the entity. A suit for
enhanced damages will not increase the resources the entity has avail-
able for the IP owner. It simply will mean that the IP owner has a lar-
ger unsatisfied judgment. In addition, a suit for an injunction will
only cut off whatever operating entity income the IP owner was oth-
erwise hoping to participate in by successfully suing for infringement.
Our intuition is that the above structure provides sufficient rea-
sons to anticipate that many IP owners will opt in. We believe that
many of those not opting in having gotten this far in the analysis ulti-
mately will opt in for reasons explored below in Part 1.112. 37 We also
recognize that a 100% opt-in rate is not likely to be possible in every
case, nor is it likely to be needed in any.
Accomplishing the proposed deal will itself entail transaction
costs. Transaction costs associated with bargaining over IP rights are
always to some extent shared between the IP owner on the one hand
and the potential infringer/assignee/licensee on the other. In the
proposed structure, many transaction costs will be borne by the [P
owners. More particularly, many of the ongoing costs of identifying
and finding the deal partner are borne by the [P owners because the
operating entity can use those DNA segments for which it obtains per-
mission and avoid those for which it does not. In other words, once
the promoter advertises the transaction to the community of [P own-
ers, IP owners will have an incentive to self-identify in order to enjoy
37 One can never say that there is absolutely zero risk of a lawsuit for infringement, but
we believe the proposed structure reduces the risk considerably.
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the benefits of participating in the enterprise. This is particularly true
when it becomes evident that remaining unknown and waiting to sue
for infringement later promises a holdout no net upside. The costs
incurred by the promoter will primarily stem from setting up the
structure in a way that, as described throughout this Article, provides
incentives for IP owners to come to and opt in to the enterprise. Also,
there surely will be ongoing transaction costs borne by all parties as
the operating entity conducts its business.
The entity—or, more likely, the promoter—also can adopt a vari-
ety of strategies to mitigate transaction costs. Representative examples
include some of the relatively new strategies generally available
through the Internet. For example, the entire deal could be adver-
tised, and even largely consummated, by the use of a thorough and
interactive set of Web pages. The pages would exchange information
and facilitate bargaining between the promoter and the IP owners
long before the operating entity begins to operate. Just like the Apple
iTunes business is conducted on the Web to issue vast numbers of IP
licenses in exchange for receiving small payments from each cus-
tomer, 38
 the operating entity could operate a Web page that is essen-
tially the reverse model, in which vast numbers of IP licenses are re-
ceived from a large population of IP owners in exchange for giving
royalties or a membership interest in the LLC.
At bottom, the entity will operate by facilitating coordination
among the many IP owners by binding them to a set of rules resulting
in a high degree of self-restraint from opportunistic behavior. At least
this is the case if all decisions are informed and rational. To help en-
sure that they are informed, the promoter must take great strides to
advertise the strategy. Little can be done, however, to eliminate the
inevitable human frailties that render individuals only boundedly ra-
tional. For example, there is always the possibility that an IP owner
will dig in and irrationally commit itself to a negotiation strategy in
which the owner refuses to recognize the financial folly of holding
out. Plus, individuals often get emotional in negotiations. We even
allow that some rational IP owners may simply believe that opting out
eventually will result in a bigger payoff, notwithstanding the attempt
to structure the deal so that is not the case.
38
 See Apple Mines Homepage, hitp://ww•.apple.com/iimes/overview (last visited
Nov. 8, 2006).
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2. Hurdle Two: Behavioralism and Peer and Social Pressure
It is recognized that structuring the financial payoffs that IP own-
ers face so that it is rational for them to opt in does not mean that
they all will. People are not perfectly rational, and a holdout IP owner
may not be convinced that the promoter and the other IP owners are
unwilling or unable to deliver additional value to avoid the holdout.
Moreover, an individual who perceives an act of infringement—
threatened or actual—against his or her [P is likely to be even less ra-
tional and more emotional than otherwise. The combined use of peer
and social pressure may help cabin any resulting holdout behavior
that arises by appealing to different sensibilities of the holdout IP
owner than direct financial payoffs do.
For the entity proposed here, any one IP owner's decision to hold
out would frustrate not only all of the other thousands of IP owners
who have opted in. Holdouts also would compromise the well-being of
the vast patient population who would be potential customers of the
business and who would hope to obtain their important medical
screening information. Consequently, the operating entity need not be
left to fend for itself on the battlefield as the target of a dispute waged
by an [P owner who opts out. Because of the stakes facing the other
members of the production team, some of whom are peers of the
holdout IP owner and others of whom are sympathetic patients, the
operating entity itself can take steps to help ensure that these different
constituencies are sufficiently informed of the problems wrought by
holdouts so that they themselves will take on the battle against the
holdout IP owner. One could imagine licensor-IP owners pressing
holdouts to participate in the business. One also could imagine patient
groups and organizations such as the American Cancer Society waging
some form of public relations campaign through the Internet or tradi-
tional media exhorting holdout IP owners to opt. in. The promoter
could also take steps to inflict reputational harm on holdouts. In short,
holdouts may be shamed into joining the enterprise."
To the extent that a holdout is at all "other regarding," simply
appealing to the holdout's sense of "right" and "wrong" may sway an
IP owner to opt in to be part of a positive effort to improve the health
" For discussions or shaming its a related context., see Paredes, .ittpra note 18, at 1086-
92. See generally David A. Skeel, Jr., Corporate Shaming Revisited: An Essay for Bill Klein, 2
BERKELEY Bus. L.J. 105 (2005); David A. Skeet, jr., Shaming in Corporate Law, 149 U. PA. 1.
Raw. 1811 (2001).
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and welfare of people, especially where the stakes may be life and
death, instead of being an obstacle to such progress. 4°
The operating entity, and by extension the promoter, may also be
subject to social pressure similar to that on a holdout IN owner. If so,
the operating entity, as well as the promoter, could claim to be caught
in the middle when dealing with holdouts in a way that may shift the
tenor of the negotiations. For example, in negotiating with a holdout,
the operating entity's management can draw on the public's expressed
desire for the DNA chip in urging the holdout to agree to opt in.
The type of peer and social pressure contemplated here is some-
what analogous to the peer and social pressure that has been at play
in the serial bankruptcies—or near bankruptcies—facing modern air-
lines.'t Rather than being disputes that are entirely characterized as
management (or capital) against labor, the financial turmoil facing
airlines has often involved efforts by one labor group to hold out in a
way that threatens the interests of shareholders, creditors, manage-
ment, other labor groups, and customers. 42 In an employee-owned
company like United Airlines, 45
 when a union holds out in labor ne-
gotiations, it threatens the interests of all employees in their role as
shareholders, as well as in their role as employees hoping for contin-
ued employment. Ticketed customers are an additional important
population of potentially adversely impacted individuals who can pro-
vide broader social pressure against a holdout labor group. When
faced with a holdout, a company's only realistic options often are to
40 For more on other-regarding behavior, sometimes referred to simply as altruism, see
generally Lynn A. Stout, Other-Regarding Prefiormes and Social Norms (Georgetown Univ. Law
Ctn 2001 Working Paper Series in Bus., Econ. & Regulatory Policy, Working Paper No.
265902, 2001), available at hup://ssrn.com/abstract=265902.
See, e.g., Susan Carey, United Lobbies for More Savings from Its Unions—Airline Says Con-
cessions Must Reach $2.4 Billion to Preserve Operations, WALL ST. J., Dec. 16, 2002, at A2 (dis-
cussing cyclical nature or these bankruptcy proceedings in which first one labor group and
then another threatens to hold out); Amy Merrick, Northwest Pilots Vole to Reopen Contract
Mks, WALL ST. J., Sept. 2, 2005, at Al 0 (same).
42
 For example, after its mechanics' union went on strike in August 2005, Northwest
Airlines suffered a drop in efficiency from pilots and flight attendants still working but
unwilling to cooperate with replacement workers. See Jeremy W Peters & Micheline May-
nard, The Replacement Mechanics: $27 an Hour and Some Choice Words from Northwest Strikers,
N.Y. Tans, Aug. 24, 2005, at CI.
45
 During United's 1904 financial crisis, the airline reimbursed employees for their
compensation concessions with Fifty-five percent of the stock in parent company UAL and
control or the conipany. See Greg Burns et al., United's Undoing: A War Within, CHI. ThIn.,
July 13, 2003. at 1. A later deal in 2002 took Crib of from employees when other conces-
sions were not sufficient to rescue the company, See Susan Carey, Leading the News: UAL
Workers Lose Majonty Rights as Stake Declines, WA1.1. ST. J., Mar. 10, 2003, at A3.
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permanently replace striking workers to the extent the law and labor
markets allow, or to bow to the holdout union to the disadvantage of
other stakeholders, particularly if caving jeopardizes the firm's long-
term financial viability. 44 Neither seems particularly attractive to the
airline's other stakeholders. This, then, creates the potential for a
formidable combination of both peer and social pressure on each in-
dividual labor group not to hold out and strike lest it trigger outrage
and frustration on the part of other employees and customers."
To be sure, the combination of the efforts to deter rational, as well
as irrational and emotional, holdouts may still be insufficient to deter
all holdouts. In such cases, the proposed DNA-on-a-chip business ap-
proach can simply omit the sequences covered by the IP rights owned
by those who do not opt in." To the extent that the total number of
41 Northwest Airlines permanently replaced nearly two thousand striking mechanics in
August 2005 as its other unions did not support the labor action. See Micheline Maynard &
Jeremy W. Peters, Northwest Keeps Flying as Its Mechanics Strike, N.Y. Tisws, Aug, 21, 2005,
§ 1, at 18.
'15 See, e.g., Micheline Maynard & Jeremy W. Peters, Northwest Airlines Threatens to Replace
Strikers Permanently, N.Y. TIM ES, Aug. 26, 2005, at C3 (explaining that certain Northwest
unions were critical of the non-AFL-CIO mechanics' union's refusal to permit a vote on
the proposed contract to take place and that these unions expressed that they were agree-
able to allowing permanent. replacement workers for the mechanics); Jeremy W. Peters &
Micheline Maynard, Head of Mechanics' Union Reassures Airline Strikers, N.Y. TistEs, Aug. 30,
2005, at C3 (reporting that during the Northwest mechanics' strike, other Northwest un-
ions did not support the mechanics, including the withdrawal of an invitation to the me-
chanics); Melanie Trottmati, Pilots' Talks with American May Lift Catch-Up Bid, WALL Sr. J.,
Nov. 4, 2005, at. A6 (discussing attempt by the American Airlines pilots' union to jump the
gun on the next round of cuts proposed at their airline in order 10 gain position on other
unions in negotiations with the company and noting that it was expected that this en-
deavor would also pressure other unions into talks with management and the union was
planning on involving them in broader deals); Edward Wong & Steven Greenhouse, Ten-
sion Mounts Between United and Machinists, N.Y. NIES, Dec. 4, 2002, at CI (reporting that to
keep the airline out of bankruptcy court, pilots and attendants at United levied social pres-
sure on the mechanics' union to accept a second proposed agreement to $700 million in
wage and benefit concessions after the mechanics' union had rejected the first agreement
by a 57-43 margin); Edward Wong, United Air's Family Is Anything But, N.Y. Times, Oct. 6.
2002, at 31 (illustrating a criticism by United's pilots' union 01 - United's machinists' union
for not making concessions that could have kept the airline financially afloat, and instead
risking bankruptcy and losing employee control of the company).
46 A middle-ground strategy, discussed in more detail below in Part ILA, would be to
keep those pieces of DNA in the project and proceed to commit acts that may ultimately
constitute infringement with the expectation that the ordinary interactions that inevitably
accompany the initiation and prosecution of an infringement suit will lead to the settle-
ment of any such suits that are brought. To satisfy' potential judgments that may come from
these suits, a good faith estimate of all possible future demands fi n ' payment might be paid
out on the front end into a separate trust For the benefit of future claimants. This tech-
nique is presently used for plaintiff class action suits in modern tort cases in which all
plaintiffs have not yet even been identified.
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sequences covered by the set of IP rights that the operating entity can
use remains large, the business will be producing a chip of significant
use. So long as the DNA chip has considerable use, there is still reason
for the operating entity to move forward, notwithstanding that DNA
sequences are "missing" because of some holdouts. That said, to the
extent that the marginal use from including a holdout's [P is
sufficiently valuable, the participating IP owners, as well as patients and
their advocates, will have an interest in pressuring any holdouts to opt
in. Simply put, although the DNA chip is not "all or nothing," the more
DNA sequences the chip has, the better. In most cases, it is likely that
the operating entity will be able to derive a sufficient benefit from having
a large number of participants so that excluding some will not be fatal.
3. Hurdle Three: Antitrust and Collective Action Benefits
Because the entity in effect coordinates a huge set of IP owners in
a given field—in the case of a DNA chip, the number is likely to be in
the thousands, covering a vast number of the sequences relating to a
particular medical condition—the entity must at least consider anti-
trust concerns. Although this level of integration may indeed trigger a
serious antitrust red flag, the social benefits conferred by such an ar-
rangement are likely to mitigate these antitrust concerns.
It is important to recognize the limits of such antitrust concerns
themselves. In the past, horizontal arrangements among practically
the entire set of thousands of entities within a given field probably
would have triggered a per se antitrust violation. 47
 But this is not
likely to occur today for several reasons. First, the arrangement pro-
posed here can be seen as vertical rather than horizontal because it is
between the user of the IP (that is, the operating entity and the pro-
moter) and the IP owners, rather than directly among the IP owners.
Modern analysis of vertical integration is significantly more permis-
sive." Second, in most cases per se treatment has been replaced by
the "rule of reason."49
 The outcry within the literature over the anti-
47
 Such an antitrust violation is governed by the Sherman Antitrust Act, 15 U.S.C.
4§ 1-7 (2000 & Stipp. IV 2004). See POLLL/P AREEDA & Lows KAI•WW, ANTITRUST ANALY-
MS: PROBLEMS, TEXT, CASES 166-202 (5th ed. 1907) (discussing per se illegality of price
fixing); Joseph W. deFuriadr., Reasoning Per Se and Horizontal Price Fixing: An Emerging Trend
in Antitrust Litigation?, 14 14:10.. L. REV. 39, 43 (1986) (stating that historically "horizontal
price fixing practices were sentenced to per se condemnation in a fairly traditional and
predictable manner").
" See generally AREIMA KAPLOW, supra note 47, at 609-784.
49 For more on the rule a reason, see id. at 165-251.
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commons problem discussed earlier"—namely, that transaction costs
block beneficial deals from taking place—itself essentially justifies the
existence of substantial consumer benefits arising from the proposed
transaction. The provision of a good or service by the operating entity
that otherwise is not available to consumers is likely to satisfy a rule of
reason analysis. Indeed, joint venture arrangements often satisfy a
rule of reason antitrust analysis as being procompetitive precisely be-
cause consumers benefit from new offerings. 51
The argument here recalls the type of analysis that has allowed
artist rights collectives, such as ASCAP and BMI, to operate without
violating the antitrust laws. 52 Yet the case for finding no antitrust vio-
lation for the operating entity is even stronger than it is for ASCAP
and BMI because the transaction provides additional benefits of the
type often included in the sort of all-things-considered rule of reason
analysis. For many of the items being bundled in the proposed entity
there is no established market at all. In contrast, one factor that made
the antitrust case against ASCAP and BMI as strong as it was is that
established markets for artist rights did exist and so the bundling of
the rights could lead to real monopoly effects." Further, the pro-
posed entity allows IP owners to coordinate with each other before
making significant investments in their own activities. Allowing a collec-
tive enterprise like the proposed operating entity at this time, before
the DNA-on-a-chip marketplace has matured, does not raise any seri-
ous spectre that IP owners will have their investment-backed expecta-
tions frustrated if the transaction passes antitrust muster. In addition,
such coordination has the added benefit of promoting certain
efficiencies. Also, unlike the relatively limited number of entities that
operate like ASCAP and BMI, the proposed entity is in no way exclu-
sive. It is anticipated that there could be large numbers of entities
structured similarly to the operating entity and serving even fully or
partially overlapping customer bases. 54
50 See supra note 2 and accompanying text (discussing miticommons problems in IP).
51 See generally AREEIM & KAL'LOW, supra note 47, at 203-5i.
52 See Broad. Music, Inc. v. Columbia Broad. Sys., Inc., 441 U.S. I, 7 (1979); cf. Licht-
man, supra note 32 (offering an account of collective rights organizations based on game
theory).
53 While the advent of broadcast music popularly supplanted previous music formats,
there had been an established market for sheet music licensing before ASCAP and MIL
See Lucia S. Schultz, Performing-Right Societies in the United States, NOTES, Mar. 1979, at 511,
513; ASCAP Celebrates 60th Anniversary, Music EDUCATORS J., Sept. 1974. at 104. 105.
54 Indeed, because the inventors of the structure proposed in this Article (die Article's
authors) are academics able to extract some benefit if the ideas in the Article enjoy sonic
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4. Hurdle Four: Deal Acceptance
The purpose of the proposed deal structure is to provide an op-
tion that is attractive to both IP owners and users but that does not
appear to have been considered previously. We believe that the pro-
posed structure can achieve a transaction that is beneficial to all in-
terested parties but otherwise is not getting clone. It is nonetheless
recognized that some may see the proposal as one that essentially im-
poses itself on IP owners—as a kind of "cram down" plan for what
amounts to mass infringement. That sort of mass infringement, if it
were to occur, might repulse some, although it should be noted that
there is always some risk of infringement in any IP-intensive business.
But even widespread infringement may be tolerated if the social bene-
fits are sufficiently large. Indeed, the public response to an approach
that is somewhat analogous to the proposed DNA-on-a-chip struc-
ture—namely, the model at the core of the Google Library Project—
suggests a far greater tolerance than might be anticipated for a busi-
ness that may be seen as imposing agreement on IP owners. 55 Indeed,
to some extent, the Google Library Project is even seen as attractive
or lashionable. 5€
Here we draw a loose analogy to the Google model as another
example of an effort to solve a collective action problem among many
IP owners. The Google Library Project essentially involves placing full-
text versions of the contents of large libraries—books, journals, etc.—
onto the Web in a way that makes them fully searchable and read-
able. 57
 Of course, many of these works are covered by copyrights, and
at least some of the use by Google of such protected work would con-
stitute infringement if not licensed by each owner. For this reason,
general interest, they are less motivated to get the proposed entity patented. Cf. State St.
Bank & Trust Co. v. Signature Fin. Group Inc., 149 F.3d 1368, 1375-77 (Fed. Cir. 1998)
(holding business methods are not exempted from being patentable); Julie Creswell, A
Wall Street Rush to Patent Profit-Making Methods, N.V. TIMES, Aug. 11, 201)6, at C7.
35 See, e.g, Kara Swisher, Technologt (a Special Report): All Things Digital—Debating the.
Googly Suit, Wma. Sr. J., June 19, 2006, at R8 (describing the Google project and quoting
Larry Lessig's ellbrts to outline the project's social benefits); Daniel Terdiman, A Tool for
Scholars tiqw Like to Dig Deep, N.Y. TIMKs, Nov. 25, 2004, at GO (describing favorable reaction
of academics to the Google project).
56
 Indeed, since the original five-library plan was established, the University of Califor-
nia has been added to Google's project while Microsoft announced a competing program
for digitizing the collection oldie British Library. See Motoko Rich, Arts Briefly: Google Snags
Another Library, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 9, 2006, at E2; Robert A. Guth, Microsoft to Offer Digitized
Books- of British Library, WALL Sr. j., Nov. 4, 2005, at B5.
57
 For a general description of the Google project, see Google, Library Project,
littp://books.google.com/googleprint/library,hind
 (last visited Nov. 9, 2006).
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Google and many of its supporters advocate expanding fair use or
other privileges so that Google would not need to obtain licenses from
the IP owners. 55
Whatever the virtues of the Google Library Project, the DNA-on-
a-chip business model should be even more attractive to the relevant
community of IP owners for a number of reasons outlined below.
Plus, it will have potential life-saving consequences for society, which
might assuage public resistance to any residual infringement or any
sense that the proposed transaction is somehow being crammed clown
the throats of IP owners.
Like the Google Library Project, the proposed operating entity
offers each IP owner a number of real, noncash benefits. First, the use
to which the [P owner's subject matter will be put in both the Google
project and the proposed DNA-on-a-chip transaction is a use that the
IP owner itself would find very difficult to achieve otherwise—unless
it employed what is in essence the same approach as the Google pro-
ject or the one we propose in this Article. More specifically, both the
Google project and the proposed entity provide a single pool of re-
sources—an online library or a chip—in which somebody can search
for the underlying IP—a copyrighted book or a patented DNA se-
quence—and such a single source for easy searching could only be
achieved by bundling the assets. Second, for both the Google project
and the proposed entity, the use by consumers or the library or chip,
respectively, is likely to generate for the IP owner important informa-
tion about other potential uses of its IP in a way that generates com-
plementary sales and other business opportunities. For example, the
complementary sales of the proposed entity discussed earlier 59 could
be increased if the proposed entity maintains a Web page that is elec-
tronically searchable, as well as a set of links back to [P owners them-
selves. Analogously, the Google project "leads users to relevant hook
titles and then guides them to a library, the publisher or an online
5H See Joan Rigdon, Goner, Books, and Fair Use. WAsi I. LAWYER. Mar. 2()06, at 21 (discuss-
ing the project's social benefits and the prospects for a more expansive approach to the
doctrine of fair use to enable the project's implementation without mass copyright in-
fringement or the incurrence of transaction costs to obtain the requisite licenses). To be
sure, the proposed DNA-on-a-chip business entity is designed to operate in a way that will
not constitute infringement because the IP rights will be licensed by the IP owners. Never-
theless, as mentioned previously, the proposed entity may follow a middle-ground strategy,
discussed in more detail below in Part 11.A, under which some infringement could occur
briefly until settlements can be reached in those infringement actions that are brought,
50 See supra notes 35-36 and accompanying text.
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bookseller."6° That is, these projects provide several types of advertis-
ing: they increase general awareness, they provide specific informa-
tion about the underlying IP and its value directly to interested users
by aggregating information and making it easily searchable, and they
direct those potential users directly to the IP owners. Likewise, the
parallel Google Print Project provides consumers free referrals to a
publisher's products, thereby actually increasing demand for copy-
righted materia1. 6 ' Publishers have reported an increase in Website
visitors and sales. 62
Unlike the Google model, the proposed DNA-on-a-chip structure
provides the IP owners with two important forms of direct ownership
in the project. First, the proposed entity provides each IP owner with
a real cash payment. 63
 Second, depending on how the proposed en-
tity's governance structure is organized, the IP owners also will have
some degree of control over the entity. More particularly, in addition
to some de facto control given their ability to at least threaten to hold
out, the IP owners will have some type of express control through the
votes they are issued. These rights to payment and control combine to
give the IP owners a real ownership stake in the proposed entity,
which should make the opportunity In participate even more attrac-
tive and further alleviate concerns that somehow the deal is being
crammed down on them.
li() Elisabeth Mummy, i$ricf, Google Library: Beyond Fair Use?, 2005 DUKE L. & Tam.
REv. 10, II 227, available at lutp://wwwiaw.duke.edu/journals/ditr/articles/PDF/2005DL
TROO I °AIL
63 The Google Print Project is a joint cam between Googte and publishers. The pub-
lishers choose winch books am digitized and Google receives 50% or the revenue generated
by its search fnction. See Ryan F.drlings, Consumer News, Publishers Fight to Stop Google's Li-
brary, 18 LOY. CONSUMER L. REv. 266, 267 (2005) (discussing the Google Print Project).
52
 In an on-line case study, Google cites the 124% increase in visitors and nearly 400%
increase in sales for Print on Demand titles by the Penn State University Press. Google,
Google Book Search Case Shady, https://books.google.com/partner/pennstate (last vis-
ited Nov. 9, 2006), The increases have been attributed to participation in the Google Print
Project. See generally Entity Anne Proskine, Note, Google's Technicolor Drearncoat: A Copyright
Analysis of /he Gavle Boob Search Library Project, 21 BERKELEY Tats-t. LJ. 213 (2006).
13 At least at present it does not appear that the Google Library Project provides the
copyright owner with any royalty payment. For a discussion of Google's view on the legal
issues relating to its project, see Jonathan Band, The Google Print Library Project: A Copyright
AllalFiS, J. INTERNET RANKING & Cont., Dec. 2005, hup://wwwarrayder.com/commerce/
JIBC/2006-02/Band.htm.
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11. ADDITIONAL OBSTACLES AND LIMITATIONS
The similarities that the proposed approach shares with the
rough analogs discussed above buttress our belief that the proposed
transaction is achievable in practice, as the other approaches are able
to overcome many of the same sorts of obstacles and limitations that
the proposed DNA-on-a-chip transaction likely Faces. That said, we
acknowledge that the proposed transaction faces some additional and
unique obstacles and limitations. Some of the most serious of these
are briefly discussed below.
A. The injunction Risk
One of the most serious obstacles to the implementation of the
proposed structure is the risk that an IP owner would proceed so far
as to obtain an actual injunction, either based on a preemptive de-
claratory judgment action or as part of a regular infringement action
brought after the entity begins operations. 64 A judgment-proofing
structure for the operating entity that takes advantage of limited li-
ability and the bankruptcy regime would operate to mitigate these
threats by decreasing the economic pool available to an IP owner
making the threat. 65 But a court-issued injunction is backed up by the
contempt power of the court, which is a stronger sanction not blunted
by a judgment-proofing structure because it puts at risk an entirely
new pool of targets—individuals who face criminal sanctions.
Nevertheless, there arc reasons the contempt power may not be
invoked. First, without endorsing the U.S. Supreme Court's 2006 deci-
sion in el3ay v. MereExchange, L.L.C., about the availability of injunc-
tions in patent cases, 66 we note that as a consequence of the Court's
opinion, even if the operating entity is found to have infringed, the
remedy may only be damages and not an injunction. Indeed, the ex-
tent to which many other IP owners have opted in to the proposed
entity will be powerful evidence either that opting in is in the best in-
terests of an IP owner in a way that should encourage a court to avoid
an injunction or that the deal offered by the proposed entity is rea-
sonable compensation in any damages calculation. Second, the con-
64 As indicated earlier, the operating entity could exclude the holdout's DNA, but the
structure does allow for the possibility that the entity may make the business decision to
infringe or that the entity will infringe unintentionally.
65 See supra note 24 for more on judgment proofing.
66 See generally 126 S. Ct. 1837 (2006) (discussing when permanent injunctions are
available in disputes arising tinder the Patent Act).
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tempt power of the court is rarely, if ever, triggered on the court's own
initiative. As a result, contempt proceedings are likely to be avoided
unless the IP owner who has won the injunction elects to seek such
additional court action. While an IP owner might elect such aggres-
sive and expensive measures, the bringing of the action for the initial
judgment and the proceedings seeking a contempt order combine to
provide substantial delay. The proposed entity can use this delay time
to better educate the holdout IP owner about the rational case for
participation. This time delay will enable sufficient exchange of in-
formation and subsequent reflection by the 1P owner to allow him to
reach the decision to participate. In addition, during this time the
holdout may face ongoing peer and social pressure to opt in.
Put differently, the transaction costs and delay associated with an
IP owner's effbrts to enforce its property rights can serve two often
overlooked socially beneficial effects. First, transaction costs and delay
discourage an IP owner from going full bore in enforcing its rights
because it can be uneconomic to do so. Second, transaction costs and
delay help IP owners and IP users coordinate with each other by pro-
viding the beacon effect needed to draw them together, the bargain
effect needed to help them strike a deal, and the time needed to do
both.° In other words, the costs and delay of continued litigation can
actually increase the likelihood that the parties will strike a deal, espe-
cially once the scope of the dispute becomes clearer as the litigation
starts to unfold and the zone of bargaining becomes more apparent.
B. The Hostage Risk
One of the most serious limitations on the practicality of the
proposed entity ironically arises if the business becomes too finan-
cially successful. As indicated above, if the business is particularly
profitable, its profits may be a sufficiently attractive hostage for a
holdout IP owner to threaten. Not only might the IP owner have a
greater incentive to hold out in an attempt to expropriate more value
for itself; but when the value of the hostage increases as the operating
entity generates larger profits, the operating entity, as well as the pro-
moter and the licensor-IP owners, will face more pressure to accede to
67
 The beacon effect refers to the way an IP right can bring together all those inter-
ested in the commercialization of its underlying subject matter. The bargain effect refers
to the way an 11) right can help these diverse persons negotiate with each other once
brought together. For more on these beacon and bargain effects, see Kieft, supra note 9, at
5, 13, 15-17.
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the holdout's demands. In effect, this limitation restates the centrality
of the structure's basic commitment to self-restraint as a coordination
facilitator. The question of hostages has been touched on above in
Part I.B.1, but some additional points are worth making.
One way to help ensure the requisite self-restraint is to structure
the interests held by the IP owners so that they are a percentage claim
on the entity's income and assets rather than a fixed amount. This can
easily be achieved by structuring the operating entity as an LLC of
which each licensor-IP owner is a member. This illustrates a more
general point regarding how the proposed structure contemplates
that the promoter and the licensor-IP owners will use transaction costs
strategically to their advantage. If the licensor-IP owners simply had a
Fixed claim under a licensing agreement against the operating entity,
such as a fixed dollar amount royalty, then it would be up to the oper-
ating entity and its management whether to give the holdout a larger
piece of the pie, which would be increasing with the entity's profits.
However, if the profits in effect are already committed to the licensor-
IP owners as members of the LLC operating entity with an equity
claim, then the licensor-IP owners in practice would have to agree to
give the holdout a larger stake. Giving the holdout a preferred return
would require restructuring the operating entity and its basic organ-
izational and capital structure to create a new class of members. 68
Given the number of licensor-1P owners that are anticipated, as well as
their interest in not giving up any of their stake in the enterprise, get-
ting their sign-off to treat a new member specially would be impracti-
cable.
The governance structure of the entity° and its economic ar-
rangement thus will operate to undercut any hostage-taking strategy.
The inevitable collective choice problems associated with getting
members of the production team, including those having actual vot-
ing rights like the other IP owners, to go along provides an inherent
check on the ability to restructure the deal in response to a holdout's
demand. In effect, the promoter and the licensor-IP owners can use
the organizational structure of the operating entity to credibly com-
mit not to revise the deal in response to a holdout's demands. 7°
68 The LLC (or operating) agreement presumably would include a provision requiring
the approval of its members to create new classes of members.
69 Depending on business form, this governance structure will be embodied in an LL.C.
(or operating) agreement, partnership agreement, or shareholder agreement.
7° Such precommitment tactics are a well-known means of gaining an advantage in so-
called "chicken" or "hawk-dove" games. One could conceptualize the promoter and licen-
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Further, the entity's organizational documents may include some
kind of express most-favored-nation ("MFN") clause that would give
each IP owner the right to the same treatment as the most-favored IP
owner. This right to equal treatment effectively undercuts the ability
for any one [P owner to obtain preferential treatment because it makes
granting any [P owner better terms too costly.
In sum, collective choice problems and MFN clauses work by build-
ing inflexibility into the deal, which means that the promoter, the op-
erating entity's management team, and other relevant constituencies
credibly can tell a holdout that their hands are tied and that they simply
cannot give the holdout a better deal," As game theorists Avinash Dixit
and Barry Nalebuff put it:
You might have thought that leaving options open is always
preferable. But in the realm of game theory that is no longer
true. Your lack of freedom has strategic value. It changes
other players' expectations about your future responses, and
you can turn this to your advantage. Others know that when
you have the freedom to act, you also have the freedom to
capitulate. To quote Oscar Wilde, "I can resist anything except
temptation." 72
Or as Adam Brandenburger and Nalebuff explained: "[MFNsi arc an
instance of 'strategic inflexibility.' People often think that having more
flexibility is one of those universally good things. It isn't. Sometimes
you have more power when your hands are tied." 73
Another strategy, discussed earlier as a basic feature of the struc-
wre, 74
 is for the entity to avoid accumulating title to assets. The entity
likely needs only access to operating assets—plants, office space, equip-
ment, etc.—not ownership. These assets can be rented from anybody,
but because of the opportunity for complementary business opportu-
sor-IP owners' credible commitment to a nonnegotiable LLC agreement as a commitment
to "drive straight" in a game of chicken, encouraging any holdout-1P owner to "swerve,"
which, in the context of the proposed deal, means to grant the operating entity a license.
See AvitiAsn K. Dtxrr & BARRY J. NALEBUFE, THINKING STRATEGICALLY: ComPriTrivE
EDGE IN BUSINESS, POLITICS, AND EVERYDAY LIFE 119-67, 205-22 (1991) (discussing
credible commitment and brinksmanship). For a classic work that bears on the analysis
here, see generally THOMAS SCIIELLING, THE STRATEGY OF CONEL/CT (1960); see also gener-
ally ADAM M. BRANDENiluitGER & BARRY J. NALEBUEE, CO-OPETITION (1996) (studying
strategies players can employ to change the game to their advantage).
71 See BRANDENBURGER & NALEBUFF, supra note 70, at 161-69.
72
 DIXIT & NALERUFF, SUM note 70, at 120.
73
 See BRANDENBURGER & NALERUFF, supra note 70, at 165-66,
74 See supra Part 1.11.1.
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nities discussed earlier, members of the proposed entity's production
team may have sufficient interest in the entity's success that they are
willing to rent their assets to the entity at more favorable rates.
Additionally, the operating entity could he run so that its net
profits are relatively small, thereby further avoiding the existence of a
potential hostage for a holdout to threaten. For good measure, the op-
erating entity would be encouraged to pay out any profits it does earn
in regular distributions to the promoter and the licensor-IP owners.
C. IP Owner Heterogeneity
We also recognize that there likely will he some diversity among
the IP owners' contributions in a way that argues against treating them
as entirely homogeneous. Some IP owners, for example, may provide a
DNA sequence that everybody recognizes at the outset is more valuable
than others. This triggers difficult questions about how to allocate dif-
ferent financial payoffs and control to each participating IP owner. Of
course, the greater heterogeneity there is, the more difficult it will be to
get all these deals done. Additionally, once the deal structure accom-
modates IP owner heterogeneity, flexibility is reintroduced into the
transaction. There then would be room for the IP owner to claim it de-
serves a larger piece of the pie because its IP is "different," and the deal
structure would presumably contemplate treating some IP owners on a
preferred basis. For reasons explained above, this fuels the hostage risk.
But the very logic of the underlying anticommons problem to which
the proposed structure responds presumes a vast homogeneous pool of
IP holders, as the anticommons problem generally presupposes consid-
erable homogeneity. Put differently, if there really were a high degree
of heterogeneity, which we think implies in most instances a manage-
able number of important players to negotiate with, then the important
players could he dealt with using existing strategies and the remaining
unimportant players could be omitted from the deal precisely because
they are unimportant.
The precise details of different arrangements to address whatever
heterogeneity exists will have to wait until actual deals are struck, and
there are many reasons to think that any heterogeneity concerns can
be resolved. Indeed, deals of all sorts get done when parties make
very different types of contributions with very different valuations.
That said, treating all IP owners the same regardless of their contribu-
tion ultimately may be the best option so long as IP owners have an
incentive to opt in, as we believe they will even if they would prefer a
larger stake.
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D. Legal and Regulatory Risk
Finally, the proposed deal, like any other deal, laces general legal
and regulatory risk. The regulatory landscape could shift so that the
deal is prohibited or at least uneconomic. A court also could find that
the transaction is illegal under current law. A particular risk with the
proposed transaction, aside from antitrust scrutiny, is the risk that the
veil of limited liability will be pierced, putting assets of the promoter
and licensor-IP owners at risk. 75
 The risk of piercing may be most
acute if the operating entity is grossly undercapitalized or is seen as
being established for the purpose of engaging in mass infringement. 76
We also recognize, however, that corporate structures designed to take
advantage of limited liability arc more routinely upheld by courts. We
envision that the operating entity will have its own management team,
will confer some control on the IP owners and will not simply be the
promoter's alter ego, will respect corporate formalities, will not com-
mingle funds with the promoter or any of the IP owners, and will be
adequately capitalized to carry on its business. Further, the proposed
transaction is designed to engineer a deal without mass willful in-
fringement. In other words, the circumstances that generally must exist
in order for a court to pierce should not exist in the deal as contem-
plated.
As with any deal, good faith and well-reasoned opinions of counsel
presumably will have to be obtained as a condition to consummating
the transaction. And even still, some parties may not have the gumption
to participate in the proposed transaction. But this is a general risk and
transaction cost that faces any new deal structure. If there is enough
value on the table, parties will get comfortable with legal and regula-
tory uncertainty. After all, somebody always has to go first.
At bottom, the likely sweet spot for the proposed entity is a busi-
ness that makes arrays of DNA on a chip where the pieces of DNA are
each protected by a patent. This is a business in which there is likely
to be general homogeneity and ex ante uncertainty among IP owners
as to the value of each of their IP assets. It also is one in which, by de-
sign, there very well may not. be
 huge profits available from the oper-
75 See supra iliac 28 and accompanying text
7fi See William P. Hackney & Tracey G. Benson, Shareholder Liability for Inadequate Capi-
tal, 43 U. Pm'. L REV. 837, 885-87 (1982); Robert B. Thompson, Piercing the Veil Within
Corporate Croups: Corporate Shareholders as Mere Investors, 13 Comq. J. INT' 3 L. 379, 387-95
(1999) (discussing undercapitalization and parent-subsidiary cases). See generally Harvey
Gelb, Piercing the Corporate Veil—The Undercapitalization Factor, 59 Cm.-KENT L. REV. I
(1982).
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ating business. But real value will come from using this technology to
diagnose or segment populations into subpopulations that can be
more profitably and more effectively treated in a targeted way. In such
a case, large profits and large customer benefits are likely to be associ-
ated with complementary businesses, such as actual therapies and
more focused diagnostics.
III. ON THE RISKS OF LEGAL REFORM
This Article's private ordering approach avoids several risks asso-
ciated with the legal reforms that. others may offer to avoid or mitigate
the anticommons problem." The risks of legal reform are private,
borne directly by the potential participants involved in some transac-
tions, but they also are social and borne by society in general. A full
evaluation of the merits of the proposed structure as compared to le-
gal reform requires an in-depth analysis of both the costs and benefits
of these alternatives. The following discussion is offered just to intro-
duce some of the costs the proposed structure is designed to avoid.
The risks associated with legal reform proposals are several. First,
because the anticommons effect is so ill-defined, there is a serious
line-drawing problem raised by any effort to target the problem with
legal reform. For some, the problem is seen as triggered by too many
upstream IP rights. But the nature of every upstream right is that it is
associated with a corresponding downstream potential infringer. As a
result, any potential infringer will always be able to make an anti-
commons argument. Second, the subjective nature of the anticom-
mons effect thus gives rise to the risk that any government body
charged with administering new rules responsive to the anticommons
'problem will be unduly influenced by some party claiming there is an
anticommons. This sets the stage for a public choice problem, where
in the name of decreasing transaction costs and monopoly effects
agency decision making actually leads to the opposite result because
big business will be better able to sway bureaucrats and political play-
ers than small business. When the key playing field is for control of
legislative and regulatory bodies, it is unlikely that a start-up business
will win the game of regulatory capture. Third, legal reform—whether
is it achieved through new statutes, new rules and regulations, or new
judicial doctrines—introduces uncertainty. The lack of certainty and
predictability can frustrate business efforts and private contracting as
77 See supra notes 13-14 and accompanying text for examples of proposed legal re-
forms to address the anticommons problem.
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parties are unclear about who has what rights. 78
 Filially, legal reform
takes time to implement. hi contrast, the private ordering approach
outlined here can be pursued immediately.
IV. SOME IMPLICATIONS FOR IP THEORY
The type of private ordering approach offered here raises several
implications for IP theory. Most obviously, its focus on coordination is
tied closely to prior work by the present authors on the coordina-
tion/commercialization theory of IP. 79 The proposed structure pro-
vides yet another example of the way this theory helps those wanting
to use the subject matter covered by IP at least as much as it helps the
owners of IP. Put differently, the approach, which is designed to help
a user avoid what otherwise would be a vast number of infringement
suits, is a concrete, if not extreme, example of the way the coordina-
tion/commercialization theory of IP is not properly seen as being
"pro-IP owners."
The proposed DNA-on-a-chip transaction highlights the impor-
tance of allowing parties to order their affairs as they see fit against
the backdrop of default rules rather than immutable rules. The im-
portance of such flexible contracting has been addressed by the pre-
sent authors in earlier work developing the so-called "basics matter"
approach to analyzing IP transactions under the law. 8° One of the
more important implications of the structure is that it provides a con-
crete example of how parties and their lawyers can engineer deals in
creative ways to avoid the threat of myriad IP infringement suits while
commercializing the W to the benefit of society. In the few cases in
which there is an act of infringement, the deal structure belies a con-
clusion that the infringement is willful—the entire enterprise is de- -
signed to avoid infringement by welcoming in all impacted IP own-
ers—which significantly decreases the risk of enhanced damages and
attorney fees. Thus, the proposed deal structure largely caps the
downside risk of any residual infringement. To be sure, because the
deal structure would likely crumble in the face of criminal liability, it
and other private ordering approaches like it provide strong reason
78 The authors have addressed the importance of certainty and predictability else-
where. See F. Scott Kieff & Troy A. Paredes, The Basics Matter: At the Periphery of Intellectual
Property, 73 Car. WAsu. L. Rix. 174, 179-83 (2004).
For morewe on this approach to IP, see generally Kieff, supra note 17; Kieff, supra note 9.
80 See, e.g., Kieft' & Paredes, supth note 78, al 179-83, 189-90: F. Scott Kieff, Contrived
Conflicts: The Supreme Court vs. The Basics of Intellectual Property Lam 30 Wm. Myrcum.I. L.
Rev. 1717, 1726, 1731 (2004).
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for us to continue to keep the patent system free of the type of crimi-
nal sanctions that are available under the copyright system. 8 I
Lastly, the approach offered here has serious implications for
how the law of indirect infringement evolves. The 2005 U.S. Supreme
Court decision in MGM Studios Inc. v. Grokstel; Ltd., 82 which made
clear that both Forms of indirect infringement—inducement and con-
tributory—arc viable causes of action for copyrights as well as for pat-
ents, only highlights the need for more analysis in this area. This need
is bolstered by recent concerns that inducement causes of action, es-
pecially under newly proposed legislation, could reach those financ-
ing and managing parties—such as banks and venture Funds—that
end up being direct infringers." Similarly, within the context of the
proposed operating entity, the promoters of such an entity might be
targets in their personal capacities for a claim of indirect infringe-
ment to the extent the entity infringes the IP rights of any holdout (P
owner.
We have elsewhere highlighted that causes of action for indirect
infringement are designed to step in where the indirect infringer is
causing the same economic effect as direct infringement. 84 Mark
Lemley has recently argued that indirect infringement should be de-
signed for cases where "the actual infringer either is not. the truly re-
sponsible party or is impractical to sue."" The structure this Article
develops is somewhat consistent with the second of these two classes,
but not the first. In fact, the approach offered here suggests the focus
should be on an alleged inducer's ex ante effect in facilitating or frus-
trating coordination. A private ordering solution to the public prob-
lem of the anticommons is a good case for a safe harbor. That is,
rather than endeavor to judge the relative responsibility of the poten-
tial infringers (direct and indirect), the legal analysis that is more
compatible with ex ante predictability and private ordering focuses
81 Cf. Copyright Act of 1976, Pub. L. No. 94-555,90 Stat. 2541 (codified as amended at
17 U.S,C.A. § 506(a) (West 2000 & Supp. 2005)) (imposing criminal liability for copyright
infringement in certain circumstances).
82 545 U.S. 913 (2005).
83 See generally Intentional Inducement of Copyright Infringements Ad of 2004: Hearing on S.
2560 Before the S. Comm. on theludiciary, 108th Cong. 123-24 (2004) (statement of Kevin S.
McCuiness, Executive Director, NetCoalition) (expressing concern that "anyone who can
be considered to be aiding, abetting, procuring, or inducing someone to engage in copy-
right infringement is subject to liability" and that Iv_lenture capitalists Land] credit card
companies ... could find themselves the target of litigation").
See Kieff & Paredes, supra note 78, at 186.
85 Mark A. Lemley, Inducing Patent Infringement, 39 U.C. awls L. Ray. 225,228 (2005).
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only on those acts that at the time conducted are likely to cause the
same economic effect as direct infringement, which is to say frustrat-
ing coordination. Although this is not identical to Lemley's "impracti-
cal to sue" point when that determination is measured in the ex post
world, it is designed to capture those efforts for infringement that ex
ante are designed to work because they would leave only direct infring-
ers who are impractical to sue. In the case of the private ordering solu-
tion to the anticommons problem, the proposed entity is instead facili-
tating coordination and therefore should be considered a desirable
solution, and not appropriate for a judgment of indirect infringement.
CONCLUSION
The utility of any approach to problem solving depends on the
circumstances of a given situation; different circumstances may war-
rant different solutions. Sometimes legal reform is appropriate. But
sometimes private parties can overcome obstacles by finding creative
ways to partner in an attempt to coordinate their activities and re-
sources. Many people criticize lawyers as being part of the problem—
as a transaction cost that clogs the system. Though this may be true at
times, lawyers often are critical in getting things done.
This Article is in keeping with the literature that sees the role of
lawyers as transaction cost engineers. This Article explores preliminary
thoughts on a private ordering solution to the anticommons problem
by focusing on both coordination and self-restraint in relation to prop-
erty rights and commercial transactions. The details of the proposed
structure would have to be negotiated in the context of an actual deal,
but we are optimistic that the structure is workable in practice and not
just in theory. We also are confident that the basic structure is viable
beyond DNA-on-a-chip technology and could be applied in other con-
texts in which the anticommons problem arises. We do not at this point
make the strong claim that the private ordering solution is necessarily
preferable to legal reform, but offer it as a worthy alternative for evalua-
tion and for its connections to the coordination/commercialization
view of IP. Additionally, the proposal has sonic explanatory power for
aspects of the legal doctrine of indirect infringement that are puzzling
under other theories of IP. Finally, the proposed model shows some
important ways in which the coordination/commercialization theory is
not accurately viewed as being "pro-IP owners." While the DNA-on-a-
chip transactiotp we propose benefits the business interests of the pro-
moter and the licensor-IP owners, consumers also win as new diagnoses
and treatments become available.
